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RECENT CASES.
BANK CHECK-BILL OF EXCHANGE-CERTIFICATION.-EAKIN V. CITIZENS
STATE BANK, 72 PAC 874 (KAN.).--H. drew a check on bank; Bank
promised, by a telegram, to pay it; E. became holder of check, but not
on the strength of Bank's action, and sued on promise. Held, that a
bank check is a bill of exchange, within the statutory provision that the
holder of such a bill cannot sue the acceptor on his acceptance, unless
said holder took the bill on the strength of the acceptance.
Though courts of eminence hold that a draft on a bank payable at
a time certain in the future is a check; In re Brown, 2 Story 5o2; Champion
v. Gordon, 70 Pa. St. 475; still the weight of authority is to the contrary.
Woodruff v. Merchants' Bank, 25 Wend. 673; 2 Daniels, Neg. Insts., p. 1574.
The essential element of a check is that it be payable on demand. Harrison
v. Nicollett Bank, 41 Minn. 488; I Morse, Banking, sec. 369. It needs no
acceptance. Lester v. Given, 8 Bush. 357. The facts of this case show a
certification of a check, valid at common law. Pope v. Bank of Albion,
59 Barb. 226. Yet the conclusion that E., taking note on the strength of
the Bank's action, cannot hold it liable, is still sound. Carr v. National
Security Bank, lO7 Mass. 48. And the classifying of a check as a bill is
in line with the trend of statutory law. Neg. Instr. Act, sec. z87.
CARRIERS-REFUSAL TO PAY ExTRA FARE-ASSAULT ON PASSENGER.-
MONNIER v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., 67 N. E. 569 (N. Y.).-A rule of the
defendant company required that passengers without tickets should pay
an extra charge. Plaintiff was unable to procure a ticket before boarding
the train because of the absence of the ticket agent from his office. Plaintiff
for that reason refused to pay extra charge and was therefore forcibly
ejected from the car. Held, that neither the company nor the conductor
is liable for assault and battery. Bartlett, Martin and Vann, JJ., dissenting.
This decision is based on the principle that the rule requiring an extra
payment from those paying on the train is reasonable and that the conductor
cannot decide from the statement of the passengers, what the facts are
which may affect the operation of the rules, as this would require too
much time and expose the company to fraud. In support of this proposition
the court cites, Bradshaw v. R. R., 135 Mass. 4o7; Wiggins v. King, 36 N. Y.
Supp. 768. But those decisions were rendered in cases where the person
by using ordinary diligence could have discovered and rectified the mistake
in their tickets. The courts are at variance as to whether the railroad can
demand more than the regular fare when the passenger's failure to provide
himself with a ticket is due to the ticket office being closed. Some courts
hold that not providing an opportunity is an implied revocation of the offer
of reduced rates to one purchasing his ticket before boarding the train.
Crocker v. New London, etc., R. Co., 24 Conn. 249. Contra, Du Laurans
v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co., I5 Minn. 49. This discord would seem to have
no application in the principal case as there was no desire to deprive the
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passenger of his opportunity of buying a ticket. Taking the two propositions
just stated into consideration, it would appear that the dissenting opini6n,
basing its decision on the absolute rights of the parties, is in accord with
the weight of authority. 5 Am. & Eng. Enc. (2 ed.) 595.
COPYRIGHT-INFRINGEMENT-CITATIONS FROM LAW BooKs.-EDw. THoMP-
SON Co. v. AM. LAW BOOK Co., 122 FED. 922.-Held, that where the author
of a law book, in collecting all the citations of cases available, includes
those found in a previously copyrighted work, and, after examining the
reports, cites such as he considers applicable in the support of his own
original text, the copyright of the earlier work is not infringed.
Matter, to be copyrighted, must be original; Brightby v. Littleton, 37 Fed.
io3; or must be arranged in an original design. Mutual Adv. Co. v. Refo,
76 Fed. 96I. Common materials cannot be so copyrighted as to preclude
others from using them. Simms v. Stanton, 75 Fed. 6. Yet compilations
of such matters in a copyrighted work cannot be copied off-hand into
another work of a similar nature, either in this country; Gray v. Russell, I
Story i; 2 Story, Eq. Tur., sec. 94o; or in England; Lewis v. Fullarton,
2 Beav. 6; although use may be made of them to discover errors and
omissions; Jarrold v. Hoylstn, 3 Kay & J. 7o8; or as a means for reaching
an original result. Copinger, Copyright, 91.
DuREss-THREATS TO PROPERTY.-SEARLE ET AL. V. GRaEG, 72 PAC. 544
(KAA.).-Held, that a mortgage, procured by threats of mischief and
injury to property, is to be regarded as having been made under duress.
The old common law rule was that, to constitute duress, threats must
be of loss of life, loss of limit, mayhem, or imprisonment. Bac. Ahr., Title
Duress, A. The threat must have been, also, such as to overcome a
will of ordinary firmness. Co. Litt., 253. And this latter rule is upheld
by modern decisions. U. S. v. Huckabee, i6 Wall. 414. But the better
view is that, if the will of the party threatened is overcome, there is duress.
Foshay v. Ferguson, 5 Hill 154; Clark, Cont., 358. Hence in this country
threats against property may constitute duress; Spaids v. Barrett, 57 Ill. 289;
the English courts disagree. Skeate v. Beale, Ii Ad. & E. 983. The
tendency seems to be to conform our law to the rule long a part of the
Civil Law. Domat, Civ. Law, pt. I, bk. I, tit. i8, 8.
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORs-LIMITATioNS--DEBTS--NEw PROMISE
-FINDLEY V. CUNNINGHAM Er AL., 44 S. E. 472 (W. VA.)-Held, that an
executor or administrator cannot make a new promise to pay a debt of
his decedent either before or after the debt has been barred by the statute
of limitations. McWhorter, P., and Dent, J., dissenting.
The reports show but few decisions on the point involved, and they
are of an uncertain character. In Forney v. Benedict, 5 Penn. St. 226, it
is held that a promise to pay by the executor, given before the debt is
barred, must be supported by a sufficient consideration. The executor in
the case above is held personally liable. Such a promise is considered in
Case v. Cushman, I Barr. (Penn.) 246, but a nudum pactum The deter-
mining factor in Ricketts v. Ricketts, 4 Lea (Tenn.) 163, is the special
request of the executor for a definite time in which to collect the decedent's
assets. Otherwise his promise to pay will not prevent the bar of the
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statute. The test in Johnson v. Ballard, ii S. C. 178, is the "willingness
to pay" on the part of the executor. An expression of such willingness
furnishes a new starting point for the running of the statute. The opinion
in question relies quite as much on the weight of authority as on the
construction of its own statute for the decision rendered. Prior to a law
of I849, this court held that it was competent for an executor, by his
promise to pay a debt of the testator, to exempt the case from the operation
of the statute of limitations, and that it was no devastavit in him to do so.
Bishop v. Harrison, 2 Leigh (Vir.) 534. It may be well said that the
main opinion has done much to clarify the law on this subject.
FERRY FRANcHISE-VOLUNTARY TRANsFm-EvANs v. ROUTINGER Er AL.,
72 PAc. 882 (IDAHo).-Held, that a ferry franchise may be voluntarily
transferred..
In England the right to transfer a ferry franchise is apparently un-
questioned. Pim v. Currell, 6" M. & W. 234. And the weight of authority
in this country corresponds. Dundy v. Chambers, 23 Ill. 369. Such a
franchise, however, grows out of a grant by the state. 3 Kent, Com. 458. It
is a contract wherein the operator assumes certain duties to the public.
Dufour v. Stacey, go Ky. 288. The law of contracts is that duties assumed
in them cannot be assigned. Clark, Cont., sec. 223. It is difficult to see
why this does not apply to ferry franchises. The Maverick, I Sprague 23.
Indeed some of our courts hold that it does. Thomas v. Armstrong, 7 Cal.
286; Knott v. Frush, 2 Or. 237. And even the English courts apply a like
reasoning to render railroad franchises untransferable. Winch v. Birken-
head Ry. Co., 13 Eng. L. & Eq., 5o6.
INJUNcTION-LABOR STRIKERS-INTERFERENCES WITH INTERSTATE COM-
MERCE.-KUNDSEN ET AL. V. BENN ET AL., 123 FED. REP. 636.-Hcld, that
employes who have left the service of an employer, because of strike, have
no right to interfere with employer's business by persuading, or otherwise
attempting to compel, other workmen to leave their work, and an injunct'.on
will lie to prevent such interference.
While the opinion of the court in this case is based on well settled
principles, a further step has been taken in the enjoining of persuasion by
strikers as a means to induce fellow workmen to leave their employment.
Acts of violence and force, of course, have been repeatedly enjoined. In re
Debs, 158 U. S. 725; U. S. v. Amalgamated Council, 54 Fed. 994; To!edo
R. R. v. Penn. Co., 54 Fed. 730. But all the previous cases have stopped
short of declaring the acts of strikers unlawful when the boundary line
between force and threats and mere persuasion has been reached. The right
of federal courts to enjoin strikers on the ground of interference with
interstate commerce has been most recently passed upon in the case of
Wabash R. R. v. Hannahan. See 12 Yale Law . 448.
MORTGAGE-SALE UNDER POWER-LimITATIONS.-MENZEL ET AL. V. HIN-
TON Er AL., 44 S. E. 385 (N. C.) -A mortgage was given containing a
power of sale. Held, that the right of the mortgagee to foreclose by execu-
tion is not affected by Code 1883, sec. 152, prescribing a ten-year limitation
for an action to foreclose a mortgage or deed of trust, but is unlimited as to
time. Clark, C. J., and Douglas, J., dissenting.
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Mortgage security in general is not deemed to come within any branch
of the statute of limitations; Union Bank of Louisiana v. Stafford, 12 How.
34o; Heyer v. Pruyn, 7 Paige (N. Y.) 465, overruling Jackson v. Sackett,
7 Wend. (N. Y.) 94, although this rule does not obtain in a few of the
western States. Lord v. Morris, i8 Cal. 482. The power of sale granted
the mortgagee does not affect the security principle involved. The condition
must be satisfied. Joy v. Adams, 26 Maine 333. In David v. Maynard, 9
Mass. 242, and Lockwood v. Sturdevant, 6 Conn. 388, notes were barred by
the statute while foreclosure on the mortgage seiuring them was allowed.
But see contra Hutaff v. Adrian, 112 N. C. 259, on which the vigorous
dissenting opinions are based.
PAY11ENT-NOTE.-WEBB ET AL. V. NAT. BANK OF THE REPUBLIC, 72 PAC.
520 (KAN.) .- Held, that the taking of a note from a debtor or a third
person for a pre-existing debt is not payment, unless it is expressly agreed
to accept such note as payment.
Certain courts dissent from the view. Thacher v. Dlnsmore, 5 Mass.
299. They reason that it makes possible a twofold payment of the debt.
Smith v. Bettger, 68 Ind. 254. But the weight of authority supports it.
Peter v. Beverly, io Pet. 532. At the least it works a suspension of the
creditor's remedy for the duration of the note. Cox v. Keiser, 15 Ill. App.
432. Under either view the rule states merely a rebuttable presumption.
Bunker v. Barron, 79 Me. 62; Story, Prom. Notes, sec. io4. And in all
jurisdictions the creditor may agree that the note shall constitute payment.
Seltzer v. Coleman, 32 Pa. St. 493. In this case the original debt is extin-
guished. Hoopes v. Strasburger, 37 0. St. 390. It revives, however, if
there is fraud in procuring the acceptance of the note; Susquehanna Co. v.
White Co., 66 Md. 444; or if it is worthless. Fleig v. Sleete, 43 0. St. 53.
PRIsoN REcoRDS-PHOTOGAPHS-MEAsUREMENT OF CRIMINALS-MAN-
DAMUS.-IN RE MOLINEUX, 83 N. Y. SUPP. 943.-This was an application
for mandamus to compel the State Superintendent of Prisons to surrender
certain photographs and measurements taken of the relator while imprisoned
as a State convict. The relator, upon a new trial, was acquitted. Held,
that mandamus did not lie.
The opinion of the court was based on the rule that mandamus will
only lie to compel a State official to perform a duty imposed on him by
State laws, which did not cover this case, and also on the ground of public
convenience. The same question has been considered before in the same
state and a like conclusion reached. People, ex rel. v. York, 59 N. Y. Supp.
418; Owen v. Partridge, 82 N. Y. Supp. 248. The decision is in line with
the previous tendency of the courts of New York and other States to
restrict redress for invasion of the right of privacy. As the case of Roberson
v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N. Y. 538, where the court of appeals
denied an injunction to restrain the unauthorized use of photographs for
advertising purposes. The violation of individual rights in such cases was,
however, further prevented by an act passed at the last session of the State
legislature and it would seem that such legislative interference should be
extended to protect innocent persons whose likeness and measurements have
been placed in the so-called "rogues' gallery" because of former conviction.
See "Comment" in this issue.
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RAILROADS-INJURY TO PERSON ON TRACK-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.-
ATCHISON T. & S. F. Ry. Co. V. SCHWINDT, 72 PAC. 573 (KAN.).-Held, that
where a railroad company has its tracks in the streets, one who, without the
excuse of necessity or convenience, walks on them and is injured by the
negligence, but not wantonness, of the company is precluded from recovery.
Where a railroad owns its right of way, one who walks upon it is a
trespasser, and can hold the company liable only for injuries due to its
wantonness. Johnson v. B. & M. R. R., 125 Mass. 75; Wood, R. R's., sec.
320. But a railroad built in a highway has no exclusihre control therein.
Middlesex R. Co. v. Wakefield, 1O3 Mass. 261; Elliott, Roads & Streets, 591.
The rights of the public are not impaired. Railway Co. v. State, 87 Tenn.
746. The company is liable for injuries due to its negligence; Brooks v.
Lincoln St. Ry. Co., 22 Nev. 816; unless contributory negligence intervenes.
McMahon v. No. Cent. Ry. Co., 39 Md. 438. The exception in the case of
persons walking on the track rests on a presumption of contributory negli-
gence. This presumption is usually held to be rebuttable; Jones v. Union Ry.
Co., 18 N. Y. App., Div. 267; Byrne v. Boadle, 2 H. & C. 722; and should be
used with care. Thomas, Neg., 576.
TRADE-UNFAIR COMPETITION-DECEPTION OF PUCLic.-HOPKINs AMUSE-
MENT Co. v. FROHMAN, 67 N. E. 39r (ILL).-Frohman was plaintiff in court
below and had contracted with the authors of the drama, "Sherlock Holmes,"
for the exclusive right of producing same. He had placed it before the
public in the principal cities of the United States at large expense. Hopkins
Amusement Co. advertised and threatened to produce a play known as
"Sherlock Holmes, Detective." Held, injunction was justified on the ground
of deception of the public.
The ultimate benefit of a trade name results to the originator of the
name and equity provides a remedy to prevent his being deprived of it by
unfair competition. Drake Medicine Co. v. Glessner, 67 N. E. (Ohio) 722;
XII Yale Law Jour. 49. The court, however, in this instance granted an
injunction for the purpose of preventing an imposition on the public irre-
spective of whether Frohman was entitled to a trade-mark in the name.
